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Drawing on literature from diverse fields of study on human perceptions of risk 
and decision-making under uncertainty, this investigation highlights some of the 
behavioural insights and implications that emerge for strategic foresight and scenario 
planning. From an extensive review and synthesis of the literature, themes in mental 
shortcuts, heuristics and biases that influence decision-making and perceptions of 
probabilities were generated and organized for further exploration through a concept 
mapping approach. Using narrative, findings were applied to and illuminated through a 
contemporary case study of proposed nuclear waste storage in an Ontario community.  
Behavioural insights were applied to two strategic foresight frameworks, and recommended 
improvements to existing models were presented and discussed. 
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Affect - a specific quality of goodness or badness that humans experience with or without 
consciousness (Slovic, 2007) 
Arational - meaning not based on or governed by logical reasoning (Oxford Dictionary). 
Bias - refers here to cognitive bias arising from information processing shortcuts. Such biases 
are patterns of deviation in judgment that occur in particular situations (“Cognitive bias,” 
n.d.), and are distinguished here from social bias, or shortcuts people use to quickly make 
sense of social situations, or to interpret and understand other people and their actions 
Heuristics - rapid, efficient and experience-based strategies for learning or solving problems. 
Mental shortcuts for information processing 
Personal Probability  - noted statistician and decision theorist, L. J. Savage suggested 
people assign probabilities to all events whether the probability is knowable or not 
Probability - the quality or state of being probable; the extent to which something is likely 
to happen or be the case (Oxford Dictionary) 
Risk – a situation involving exposure to hazard, where outcomes can be identified and 
probabilities assigned to various outcomes (Sunstein, 2007) 
Strategic Foresight – “a systematic approach to gathering intelligence about possible 
futures and building shared visions, aimed at guiding and enabling present-day decisions” 
(“2020 Media Futures!: Strategic Foresight,” n.d.)  




“Planting Trees  in  the Desert  May Halt  Climate Change” Scotland (Boland, 2013) 
“Can plant ing t rees  in  the deser t  he lp  save earth?”  – Canada (Aulakh, 2013) 
“Carbon farming:  UAE deser t s  ideal  for  saving the earth” – United Arab Emirates  
(Matthews, 2013) 
 
The global response to the research was overwhelmingly positive. Planting drought tolerant Jatropha 
trees in the empty deserts of Africa and the Middle East had been calculated by a team of scientists to 
provide a feasible and cost-effective way to mitigate climate change by sequestering climate-warming 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. The study by a team of German agricultural researchers proposed 
planting the highly drought resilient plantations specifically in coastal deserts so the small amount of 
irrigation required could be provided by a nearby desalination plant drawing water from the sea, 
rather than tapping into local water table. Over time, the trimmings from the trees would provide 
biofuel to power the desalination plants. An elegant solution. 
 
The paper, published in July 2013 in Earth Systems Dynamics, the international online journal of the 
European Geosciences Union, reported the team’s findings that a one hectare plantation of Jatropha 
could capture up to 25 tonnes of atmospheric carbon dioxide each year over a 20 year period (Becker, 
Wulfmeyer, Gebel, & Munch, 2013). That’s roughly equivalent to all the carbon dioxide produced by 
motor vehicles in Germany absorbed by a forest covering just 3% of the Arabian Desert. It is little 
wonder, then, that reporters and bloggers from around the world and across traditional divides – from 
the oil rich Arabian Peninsula to the boreal forests of Canada – lauded the study as good news.  
There were occasional cautions that Jatropha might not be the best solution, since it is believed by 
some to be toxic to soils over time. But, as one article points out, “most of the land in such regions is 
not much good for anything else” (Matthews, 2013), anyway. Others pointed to early trials with 
Jatropha in India that suggest it might not thrive as easily as hoped, leading others to recommend 




In addition to carbon sequestration on a grand scale, the forest could also over time generate its own 
rain in the former desert, making the region more habitable and available for food production.  
 
It seemed like a great idea. 
 
This is where my major research project began – reading the news over morning coffee, feeling excited 
the world may have finally caught a break on this whole climate change thing. Trees were going to 




Except how could a German team plant trees in the Kalahari – who would have a say over such a 
strategy? And were these deserts actually empty? What about the people and complex ecosystems in the 
Kalahari and other desert regions – how would their voices be heard? I wondered how much is at 
stake for the local governments in their negotiations with international oil companies eager to find 
biofuel alternatives to oil and bitumen reserves. In the grand scheme, thwarting a coming climate crisis 
might supersede preservation of a few hectares of coastal desert known. But who would get to say? 
 
I wondered who would determine this: who would have “some say” by contributing to the debate.  
And whose voices, both human and non-human, would not be heard in this discussion. I wanted to 
explore who would be afforded “a say” – a decision-making role – in this scenario. And who would 
have “the say” – the ultimate decision-making authority in all of this? What frameworks would they 
use to decide, and how could these possibly generate a fair assessment? Most importantly, how would a 





This research project began with an exploration of how strategic foresight could improve 
decision-making for public benefit or a common good specifically within a scope of trans- 
boundary environmental concerns. The starting aim was to outline criteria for 
consideration when developing tools for such a lofty goal. But who would use this 
framework?  
 
What emerged during data gathering was a recognition that communities (both geographic 
communities and communities of common interest or identity) frequently mobilize 
themselves or self organize (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Meyer, 2004; Shirky, 2008) in 
reaction to media stories and political and public policy decisions. Unsurprisingly, people 
react most to things that upset them. Everyday, people see news stories or hear ideas that 
shape their opinions, evoke reactions or trigger action.   
 
Campaigns led by community members are often successful in influencing public policy 
(Slovic, 1997). But if many of such actions are triggered by information that is upsetting, 
are the decisions in which these campaigns are grounded the right decisions? Are they 
rational decisions - rational here meaning that they serve, and don’t undermine, the long-
term interests of the decision makers. Most importantly, in complex domains with high 
uncertainty, how can activists know their positions are the ones that will accomplish their 




Environmental concerns pose extraordinary challenges, many of which are intractable 
problems of high complexity, multiple and competing stakeholder needs, long time delays, 
great geographic distances and disconnects between causes and outcomes. These factors 
confound human intuition and perceptions of cause, effect, control and responsibility. 
Such complex challenges have so far proved resistant to contemporary problem solving 
tools and approaches.  
 
Complexity, uncertainty and risk perception make it challenging to evaluate options. 
Competing stakeholder needs and interests – often separated by political and geographic 
boundaries – complicate decision-making for policy makers and regulators accustomed to 
implementing optimization strategies. Simultaneously, competing maximization strategies 
of various stakeholders with differing levels of power, influence and authority exacerbate 
the challenges leading to what seems to play out as a tragedy of the commons. Massive 
natural systems are at work and we have incomplete understanding of their complex 
dynamics. This is a domain where a successful intervention can bring devastating 
unintended consequences: doing the wrong thing right (think cane toads in Australia) can 
be worse than doing nothing, or than doing the right thing poorly. Where environmental 
challenges are concerned, the harms may also be irreversible. 
 
Foresight approaches, including the use of scenarios in a larger strategic foresight context,  
are proposed to support and improve decision-making under such complexity and 
uncertainty. Insofar as scenarios support people to think about multiple variables and 
elements simultaneously and within complex structures, they are tools well-suited to 
! 
5 
thinking about complex problems (Kahn, 1962; Kees van der Heijden, 1996). Intuitively, 
this makes them ideal for supporting communities and the decision makers they influence 
to make more informed – and presumably better – decisions that consider both immediate 
and long-term objectives and outcomes for multiple stakeholders.  
 
Strategic foresight typically involves input and feedback from multiple layers of participants 
contributing both individually and in small or larger groups. The level of engagement, and 
the balance of internal to external stakeholders vary by project, but in most cases a strategic 
foresight project will include some or all of the following at different stages: 
 
• Individuals, including clients or commissioning agents, facilitators, researchers, 
contributors (authors, graphic designers), content and process experts, interviewees, 
interviewers 
• Small groups, including a core team directing the project, senior managers, 
collaborators, key stakeholders, content experts, break-out sessions from larger 
groups 
• Large groups of stakeholders, experts, “user” groups, members of the general 
public 
 
The levels of participation are not mutually exclusive in that some individuals may 
participate through multiple roles, including as members of small or large groups, at 
various points in the process. The dynamics of people once they form groups has been well 
covered in foresight and scenario planning literature. What seems to be missing from the 
! 
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literature, however, is a closer look at the individuals throughout the foresight process, 
both when they engage as individuals, and when they contribute through groups.  
 
For example, what are the decision-making patterns and cultural and personal experiences 
individuals bring with them to this process? Apart from literature focusing specifically on 
facilitators, there is a dearth of information or insight available. The specific focus for this 
project are those decision-making elements – the emotional and mental “baggage” – 
formed long before people engage in a foresight project individually or in groups to 
contribute or sort information, to brainstorm, or represent their expertise, demographic or 
community of interest in an interview or consultation.  
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Several fields of study tell us human decision-making is not always rational, logical or 
analytical. It is fraught with quirks. The mental shortcuts, considerations, justifications and 
intuitions we rely on when making choices carry systematic errors that can contribute to 
decisions that are not always in our best interests – especially over the long term and when 
we make decisions in situations of high uncertainty or real or perceived risks.  
 
An understanding of individual decision-making, then, including perceptions of risk and 
probability that are fundamental to many decisions, can provide insights for positioning 
strategic foresight as a thinking approach in grappling with complex challenges that 
necessarily involve uncertainty because of the length of the time horizons and/or pace of 
! 
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change in the domain being explored.  
 
Strategic foresight holds promise by offering support for expansive thinking and creative 
problem solving. What is yet unclear is if these tools can be optimized for the normal and 
somewhat predictable foibles of individual human decision-making that may limit such 
expansion.  
 
This project, then, aims to contribute toward (re)designing a strategic foresight approach 
that considers and accounts for heuristics in individual decision-making. It asks the 
question: How might strategic foresight approaches be improved by accounting for or even 
embracing the predictably “irrational” (or arational) strategies of human decision-making?   
 
1.2 Approach 
This inquiry will draw from literature on cognitive, social and clinical psychology as well as 
behavioural economics, negotiations theory, decision theory and standard economics. It is 
an exploration through multiple lenses of the complexities of human individual decision-
making and judgments of risk, uncertainty and probability. The aim is to introduce an 
integrated, transdisciplinary investigation of a complex issue: human individual decision-
making in strategic foresight. 
 
Throughout the paper, environmental challenges are used as a lens to explore the interplay 
of these domains since these pose complex challenges that frequently confound human 
! 
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decision-making and problem-solving skills and abilities.  
 
This project will: 
1) Look at a variety of insights into human individual decision-making, and  
2) Attempt to map and make sense of some of the themes among them before  
3) Exploring these in relation to time-tested foresight frameworks, and  
4) Highlighting some of the implications that may emerge for strategic foresight 
practitioners.  
 
For the sake of providing a starting place for subsequent discussions, the project will 
attempt to draw from these insights recommendations that contribute toward improved 





2. Research Questions 
This project aims to explore the following: 
1) What informs and influences individual human decision-making in situations 
of uncertainty and risk? 
2) How do these decision-making frameworks interact with strategic foresight 
approaches to problem solving? 
3) How might foresight approaches be improved by incorporating these insights 
into individual human decision-making?  
 
These insights will be applied to a set of recommendations for improving a standard 




Primary and secondary research was used in this inquiry to respond to the research 
questions. The paper draws on literature from cognitive, social and clinical psychology, 
behavioural economics, negotiations theory, decision theory and standard economics to 
generate a framework for reconsidering the interplay of individual decision-making and 
scenario planning. 
 
Three methods of data collection, analysis and synthesis were applied: 
 
3.1 Resource Review 
Academic and mainstream literature resources, as well as well-known web resources, were 
searched and reviewed for the domains of inquiry central to this inquiry, including 
individual decision-making, heuristics and cognitive biases, scenario planning, and 
judgment in environmental concerns. Bibliographies from key resources related to and 
surfaced through the search were also searched.    
 
3.2 Concept Mapping  
Concept mapping as a tool is well-suited to retaining the complexity of an inquiry space 
while converging on priority areas (Carleton, Cockayne, & Tahvanainen, 2013; Cockayne, 
n.d.). It is a graphical mixed-methods approach that supports visual organizing of ideas and 
relationships among them (Ader & Mellenbergh, 1999). Concepts that emerged from the 
! 
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review and synthesis were organized as notions and relations by the investigator within the 
context frame, and mapped to identify priority areas from the broad inquiry to be brought 
forward for further assessment. The coding system used supported a hierarchical synthesis, 
beginning with the diverse concepts in individual decision making from the initial review 
and organizing them in a cascade of increasing generalization. Elements of high specificity 
or with multiple contributing factors were coded as lower order, while those recognized as 
causing or contributing to the lower order effects were coded as more general, cardinal or 
higher order concepts. The highest order concepts were selected as the priority ones for 
further processing.  
 
A second similar system of coding and organizing was applied to the priority concepts to 
rate the discernibility of the reference point for the cognitive biases, and the predictability 
of the direction in which they shift perceptions. Predictability here refers to the potential 
for practitioners to accurately anticipate the direction of the bias in a strategic foresight 
setting. An additional coding exercise rated the stickiness or tenacity of the bias effect – 
specifically, its susceptibility to influence by a practitioner in a strategic planning setting.  
 
3.3 Narrative  
Kees van der Heijden (1996) outlines the importance of scenarios as a cognitive, perceptive 
and reflective tool for presenting multiple pieces of information simultaneously within a  
structure and context, calling attention to elements and relationships that might be 
overlooked, and thinking through concepts creatively. In Scenarios: The Art of the Strategic 
! 
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Conversation, he highlights the essential role of a storyline “in which events unfold over 
time through a progression of cause and effect” (Kees van der Heijden, 1996, p. 133) for 
organizing complex information in efficient and memorable ways. One of the fathers of 
scenario planning, Herman Kahn (1962), encouraged role-playing in combination with 
scenarios to further aid in imagining the information.  
 
This project incorporates a narrative storyline as a tool for supporting readers to organize, 
reflect on, imagine, retain and share the information presented in the paper.  The narrative 
uses nuclear energy as a lens to explore the interplay of these domains, Perceptions of 
nuclear power appeared continuously in the literature on both scenario planning and 
cognitive bias over the 60 year scope of the research review (Deutch & Moniz, 2003; 
Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1979; Kajenthira, Holmes, & McDonnell, 2012; Slovic, 




Narrative 1 -  Introduction to the Deep Geologic Repository 
(DGR)  
On the eastern shore of Lake Huron, Kincardine, Ontario is currently undergoing a decision-making 
process and public review where decisions made in the present could have an impact on an irreversible 
scale. The proposed Deep Geologic Repository Project for Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive 
Waste (DGR) would store waste from the Bruce Nuclear Plant 1.2 kilometres from the Lake Huron 
shore in rock authorities insist is highly stable. Under this plan, the radioactive waste – considered 
dangerous for 100,000 years – would be buried in planned perpetuity on the shoreline of one the 
world’s largest freshwater lakes. The Great Lakes system supplies drinking water for 40 million people, 
and irrigation and industry to tens of millions more downstream. The facility would be actively 
monitored for 10 years, then sealed and considered a success. The community is divided on the 
proposed plan – the municipality has approved it, while some community members have started a 
campaign to “Stop the Great Lakes Nuclear Dump” next to Lake Huron. 
 
Is this plan a good idea? 
! 
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4. Individual Decision-Making in Uncertainty !
Decision-making theory is a domain of inquiry unto itself with a focus primarily on 
normative models for making good, statistically informed decisions. Standard economics 
modeling of decision-making has spawned investigation from psychological perspectives 
into what really happens when humans face uncertainty. The Nobel-winning Prospect 
Theory launched research into this question which has become the domain of cognitive 
psychology and the contemporary behavioural economics field (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
 
With the aim of answering the larger question of how foresight approaches might be 
improved by incorporating insights into individual human decision-making, this study 
explores first what informs and influences individual human decision-making in complex 
situations that are the domain of strategic foresight. This investigation will focus primarily 
on the heuristics and cognitive biases that shape individual human perceptions, judgments 
and decision-making in uncertainty. 
 
4.1 Individual Human Decision-making 
An assumption common to most theories of decision-making is that good decisions require 
reflection, objectivity, and careful consideration of options with an understanding of 
potential outcomes. In reality, decision makers are humans, so decision-making processes 
are imbued with and fettered to all the foibles and evolutionary legacies of human 
! 
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psychology, including how people form mental maps, perceive risk, and rely on mental 
shortcuts to assess probabilities, judge risks, and make choices.  
 
4.2 Two Systems of Thinking 
A prevailing theme in research into human decision-making hinges on a two-system 
understanding of thinking (Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2011; Sunstein, 2007) that outlines 
both an automatic, instinctive, experience-informed system, and an analytic, reflective 
system more typically associated with thinking. Such analytic processing is slow thinking that 
requires effort, conscious application of rules, probabilities, and calculations (Kahneman, 
2011). Experience-based decision-making, by contrast, is fast and automatic, relating to new 
situations through images, emotions and memories (our own or vicarious experiences). 
Research by psychologist Paul Slovic and colleagues over many years emphasizes that affect 
– a sense that something is positive or negative – plays a fundamental role in experiential 
decision-making and its adaptive ability to process and provide actionable information 
instantaneously (Fischhoff et al., 1979; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004; 
Slovic, 1997).  
 
These two widely recognized systems are not mutually exclusive, instead operating 
simultaneously and with mutual reliance. Contemporary wisdom and research suggests 
good decision-making relies on integration of the two systems to guide and temper each 




4.3 Normative Models 
When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?  
John Maynard Keynes 
 
Normative models of decision-making outline how decisions would be made if “homo 
economicus” were weighing choices: they are models of how humans should make decisions. 
Such models, including Expected Utility Theory from standard economics, outline how a 
purely rational decision maker should behave in a set of circumstances to produce good 
decisions. These analytic models hinge on justification of decisions through logic, evidence, 
and analysis, and propose a state where “behavior is mediated by conscious appraisal of 
events” (Slovic et al., 2004).  
 
4.3.1 Analytic Decision-making 
Normative models of decision-making correspond with what has been termed the rational 
system of thinking (Epstein, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000; Gilovich & Griffin, 2002; 
Kahneman, 2011), and is perhaps more accurately and neutrally referred to as the reflective 
or analytic system (Finucane et al., 2000; Kahneman, 2011; Slovic et al., 2004).  
 
In a rational, analytic decision making process, normative models assume each decision 
involves: 
1) A set of possible actions 
2) A set of possible future states of the world 
! 
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3) Information on the probability of different future states of the world, and 
4) Information about the outcomes of possible action under future states of the world.  
- (Marx & Weber, 2012, p. 103) 
 
An accurate and informed judgment of possibility and probability, then, is fundamental to 
rational decision-making. If these elements are flawed, the decisions that ensue will have 
those flaws embedded in them. 
! 
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Narrative 2 -  Analyt ic  Judgment and Decis ion -Making ! 
 
Statistics and information on nuclear power in Ontario 
Timeline: nuclear power produced in Ontario for approximately 40 years 
Nuclear reactors in Ontario: 20 
Energy produced: approximately 50% of Ontario’s electricity 
Greenhouse gas emissions from nuclear reactors during operation: none 
 
Bruce Nuclear Generating Station 
Where: Township of Kincardine (Inverhuron and Tiverton), in Bruce County, Ontario 
Size: largest nuclear power plant in the world, by number of operational reactors 
Reactors: 8 CANDU reactors 
Constructed: 1970-1987 
Operated by: Bruce Power (private), by long-term lease with Ontario Power Generation (OPG) 
(crown) 
Employees at power station: approximately 3,800 – largest employer in Bruce Country 
Population of township: 11,200 
 
Current monitoring and security at Bruce plant 
Regular monitoring for radiation in:  
- milk samples from local farms (weekly) 
- drinking water at local treatment plants (sampled twice daily, and tested weekly) 
- ground water at several surface, shallow and deep well locations 
- additional analysis of aquatic sediment, fish, livestock feed, honey, eggs, fruits, vegetables 
Security force: Bruce Nuclear Response Team is equivalent in size to security (SWAT) force in cities 
of 100,000 people  






Storage of waste materials 
Current storage of spent fuel rods from Bruce plant: in pools at the Bruce site 
Current storage of intermediate-level radioactive material for all 20 of Ontario’s reactors: in concrete 
and steel vaults below the ground surface at the Western Waste Management Facility on the Bruce 
site 
Current storage of low-level radioactive materials for all 20 of Ontario’s reactors: in 11 buildings at 
the Western Waste Management Facility on the Bruce site 
 
Proposed Deep Geologic Repository 
Purpose: long-term storage for waste from nuclear power generation 
Location: 680 metres beneath current Bruce plant site 
Type of material to be stored: low- to intermediate-level radioactive waste 
Amount: 200,000 cubic metres, plus proposed expansion for additional 135,000 cubic metres  
Period for which material will remain radioactive: 100,000 years 
Age of rock formation: 450 million years 
Proposed timeline of monitoring plan: 300 years 
 





Figure 1 -  Deep Geologic  Reposi tory   
From http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/infographic-ontarios-1-billion-plan-to-bury-its-nuclear-waste/article14297942/ 
 !  
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4.4 Descriptive Models 
Theories that attempt to model how people make decisions in real world situations are 
descriptive models, and include Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), the Theory of Context-Dependent Choice (Krantz & Kunreuther, 2007), 
and the field of behavioural economics more broadly. These correspond with automatic, 
experiential thinking, which is sometimes referred to as irrational thinking and may also be 
called arational, or not explained by reason.  
 
4.4.1 Experiential Decision-making  
This is the faster system that uses images, metaphors and associations for information 
processing. In a two-system theory of thinking, the experiential system supports immediate 
action through affective processing of information that lets humans anticipate future 
outcomes of potential actions in immediately recognizable codes of good or bad, or pleasure-
causing or pain-causing, rather than processing stimuli analytically (Epstein, 1994; Finucane 
et al., 2000; Gilovich & Griffin, 2002; Kahneman, 2011). 
 
In circumstances where outputs of the two systems are in conflict, behaviour is often 
determined by the experiential affective processing system because it is vivid and operates 
instantaneously, delivering output earlier than the reflective system (Marx & Weber, 2012, 




4.5 Uncertainty, Probability and Risk Perception  
Contemporary evidence-based notions of risk hold that risk is an objective, measurable 
reality (Kajenthira et al., 2012). While acknowledging that dangers are real and present in 
the world, many scholars regard risk as a social and cultural construct as much as an 
external reality (Bradbury, 1989; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Slovic et al., 
2004; Slovic, 1997; Weber, 2006). To illustrate this point, Slovic (1997, p. 280) highlights 
that scientific or evidence-based assessments of risk are grounded in theoretical frameworks 
and models. The structure of such models is subjective, and the content hinges on 
assumptions and judgments. As such, he and colleagues have suggested, scientific models 
of risk are still models of risk perception similar in concept to those formed by non-scientists 
or non-economists. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, risk here is defined as situations where outcomes can be 
identified and probabilities assigned to various outcomes (Sunstein, 2007).1 In statistical 
models, probabilities can be assigned to most things, leaving very few true uncertainties 
(Sunstein, 2007). Similarly, individuals tend to assign a “personal probability” to outcomes, 
leaving few things truly uncertain from an individual or lay perspective, as well (Savage, 
1954). 
 !  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Risk is distinguished here from uncertainty, which occurs when outcomes can be identified but no 
probabilities assigned to those outcomes (Sunstein, 2007) 
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4.5.1 Risk Perception Varies Between Experts and Laypeople 
 
Although the controversy about location of the high-level nuclear waste repository 
generates powerful emotions, large numbers of people seem amazingly unconcerned 
about the fact that high-level nuclear waste is currently being stored at nuclear reactors 
that are in close proximity to major population centers. Referring to the current 
controversy about the (U.S.) Department of Energy's nuclear waste disposal plans for 
Yucca Mountain (Nevada), Slovic, Flynn, and Layman (1991) described officials from the 
Department of Energy, the nuclear industry, and their technical experts as “profoundly 
puzzled, frustrated, and disturbed by public opposition that many of them consider to be 
based on irrationality and ignorance”.   
   - (Loewenstein et al., 2001, p. 1603) 
 
Perceived risk involves social and cultural construction as well as predictable psychological 
effects. As mentioned above, risk is qualitatively perceived, but may also be quantitatively 
derived with existing statistical models (Kajenthira et al., 2012). This phenomenon means 
risk is frequently perceived differently by “experts” and laypeople, or non-experts in a given 
domain. Slovic (1997) highlights earlier literature that extends this argument by suggesting 
lay perceptions and expert perceptions of risk are commonly dichotomous. He observed 
that “experts are seen as purveying risk assessments, characterized as objective, analytic, 
wise, and rational – based upon the real risks. In contrast, the public is seen to rely upon 
perceptions of risk that are subjective, often hypothetical, emotional, foolish, and irrational” 
(Slovic, 1997, p. 179). 
 
An investigation of risk perception in various stakeholder communities (scientists, local 
villagers, and plant workers) regarding risks from a chemical plant in Kazakhstan known as 
a site of regional mercury contamination (Kajenthira et al., 2012) confirmed that the 
qualitative risk perceptions of laypeople are likely to vary from quantitatively established 
risks even in a context of knowledge translation, transparency and communication of risks.  
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One key distinction is the technical assessments of risk that “experts” employ, including 
those using cost-benefit analysis tools, tend to limit impacts from risk events to direct 
impacts like mortality and morbidity, while laypeople also include in their mental risk 
models of risk a sense of equity over time (to future generations) and in space (NIMBYism)2 
or across demographics (Kasperson et al., 1988). Additionally, Kasperson and colleagues 
highlight that the secondary repercussions of risk events, and those that are socially 
amplified, are often neglected in traditional cost-benefit models, but are considered in 
assessments by laypeople. Experts focus on individual risk elements while non-experts 
consider the burden of risk.3 
 
While experts frequently assess risks and probabilities with analytic tools that overcome 
strictly experiential assessment, extensive research suggests experts are not immune to the 
impact of heuristics on their perceptions of risk (see Example 1, below). 
 
4.5.2 Social Amplification of Risk 
Perceptions of risk can also be socially amplified or attenuated as information about risk 
events is communicated, received, reproduced and spread through social and cultural 
structures and channels (Kasperson et al., 1988). Social amplification of risk occurs when 
communicating and meaning-making trigger self-reinforcing loops and thereby generate an 
over-estimation of risk probability or impact. The inverse is also possible, resulting in 
underestimation of risk or impact when social mechanisms limit recognition of a risk and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Not In My Back Yard, wherein people reject changes in their neighbourhood or community 




its repercussions. Attenuation of risk is recognized as an adaptive mechanism for humans, 
helping to tune out the constant risks of navigating daily life, but as Kasperson et al (1988) 
point out, downplaying risks doesn’t offer protection from their adverse effects or the 





Example 1.  Expert Judgment Impacted by Heuristics 
Slovic and colleagues (2004) asked forensic psychologists and psychiatrists to judge the 
likelihood that a patient would engage in violent behaviour after being discharged from 
hospital. When presented with a risk that was framed as a relative frequency, such as “of 
every 100 patients similar to Mr. Jones, 10 are estimated to commit an act of violence to 
others”, clinicians judged the patient to be more dangerous than those who were told 
the equivalent risk, framed as probability, that “Patients similar to Mr. Jones are 
estimated to have a 10% chance of committing an act of violence to others.”   
From their research: 
“Follow-up studies showed that representations of risk in the form of individual 
probabilities of 10%...led to relatively benign images of one person, unlikely to harm 
anyone, whereas the “equivalent” frequentistic representations created frightening 
images of violent patients (e.g. “Some guy going crazy and killing someone”).” 
(Slovic et al., 2004, pp. 316–7).  
Scenarios and narratives that are vivid increase the likelihood of producing such affect-




Narrative 3 -  Experts  and laypeople vary in perceptions of  r i sk ! 
Public perceptions of risk have been found to determine the priorities and legislative agendas of 
regulatory bodies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (US), much to the distress of agency 
technical experts who argue that other hazards deserve higher priority.   
- (Slovic, 1997, p. 278)  
 
Would you bury  poison next  to  your wel l ?  
 - Stop the Great Lakes Nuclear Dump 
 
In the years following the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979, nuclear power plants around 
the world were subjected to increased safety checks that required them to be shut down and restarted 
more frequently; however, it is these start-up and shut down phases that pose the greatest risks 
(Kasperson et al., 1988). 
 __________________________________________________________ 
 
Public perceptions of probability and risk include elements that fall outside the standard frameworks 
of expert analysts. While technical risk assessments include probabilities of individual factors, lay 
judgments also tend to include the burden of risk (the combination of multiple risk factors in a 
domain), trust in those providing information, fairness, concern for multiple generations, and a sense 
of common or community good.  The following passage is drawn directly from community-produced 
resources4, employing language that frames the Kincardine Deep Geologic Repository situation from 
the Stop the Great Lakes Nuclear Dump perspective, and illustrating elements of risk considered 
within this framework. 
 
“Reasons To Be Concerned 
1.  Radioactive Waste Beside Lake Huron? 
Any risk of radioactive nuclear waste contaminating the Great Lakes is too great a risk to take 
and need not be taken. Ontario Power Generation, the applicant, states this underground dump 
"is not likely to result in any significant residual adverse effects to human health or the 
environment, including Lake Huron and the Great Lakes." Is "not likely" good enough? Any risk of 
buried nuclear waste entering the largest body of fresh water in the world is too great a risk to take, 




2.  Buried Radioactive Waste is Forever Toxic 
Some intermediate level radioactive nuclear waste remains toxic for 100,000 years. 
3.  This Rock is Right? 
No scientist or geologist can provide us with a 100,000-year guarantee. An underground nuclear 
waste dump in limestone is unproven and unprecedented. 
4.  OPG Faith In Computer Modelling 
Computer models cannot predict what will happen in 100,000 years; the models cannot be 
validated or verified. 
5.  International Impacts Ignored 
Burying radioactive nuclear waste beside the Great Lakes could impact 40 million people. 
6.  Highly Controversial Dump Site Selection 
There was no process to look at any other locations for the low and intermediate level Nuclear 
Waste Dump in Canada. Ontario Power Generation did not consider ANY other sites for this 
nuclear waste dump except right beside the Great Lakes. Is this responsible? 
7.  2nd Dump Planned 
The Kincardine Nuclear Waste Dump will pave the way for a high level Nuclear Waste Dump to 
store highly toxic radioactive spent nuclear fuel. 
8.  OPG claims it has done its homework, yet the Joint Review Panel's own consultant, Dr. Duinker, 
concluded that OPG's analysis was "not credible, not defensible, not clear, not reliable, 
inappropriate."” 
 
Consistent with research by Lowenstein (2001) and Slovic (1997), the framing of risks, uncertainties 
and probabilities from this perspective considers: 
• The risk of a worst-case scenario is human-made, making it an unnecessary risk 
• Risks over long time horizons and for multiple generations 
• Likelihood of substantial - not just incremental - changes over long time horizons 
• Unknown unknowns - risks that can’t be predicted with current tools 
• Fairness related to: geo-political disparities; local burden of risk; human-made (unnecessary) 




Figure 2 -  S i te  of  Great Lakes Nuclear  Dump 
Image from stopthegreatlakesnucleardump.com 
!!
The visual representation of the situation from the Stop the Great Lakes Nuclear Dump 
communication materials suggests an ecosystem or watershed approach to considering risks, with 
complex dynamics and networked effects across geographic breadth embedded in the choice of image. 
Contrast this with the highly localized vertical slice visualization of risks presented by the Ontario 
Power Generation in Figure 1 (p.18).!  
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5. Foresight in Complex Decision-Making 
 
Strategic foresight is defined for the purposes of this paper as: 
 
A systematic approach to gathering intelligence about possible futures and building 
shared visions, aimed at guiding and enabling present-day decisions  
- from 2020 Media Futures5  
 
Foresight approaches are used to support consideration of a multitude of future 
possibilities rather than to accurately predict or project a single future outcome. 
Accordingly, the approach varies with the express goals of a foresight project (Bishop, 
Hines, & Collins, 2007; Höjer, Ahlroth, Dreborg, & Ekvall, 2008; Kees van der Heijden, 
1996). To clarify and improve alignment between the objectives of a project and the 
approach employed, Borjeson et al (2006) proposed a typology of three categories of 
scenarios: predictive, exploratory and normative as follows: 
• Predictive scenarios, including forecasts and “what if” scenarios, ask what will 
happen. They focus on imagining what will happen if…?  
• Exploratory scenarios aim to explore what can or might happen, usually along 
longer timelines and with substantial (not incremental) shifts taken into 
consideration. These types are used primarily to prepare for various futures, or assess 
consequences of various strategic choices 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The multi-industry foresight project, 2020 Media Futures, led by sLab at OCADU (“2020 Media 
Futures!: Strategic Foresight,” n.d.) 
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• Normative scenarios aim to preserve through adaptation, or transform toward a 
desired future. In either case, a target is identified, with scenarios informing 
strategies to achieve a desired state. 
 
More generally, strategic foresight does not aim to outline or predict what has been termed 
the official future, or what the future might look like if a straight line were drawn from 
present trends out to a point 20 years from now, for example. Instead, a foresight approach 
can be expected to help unearth, imagine, describe, think about, discuss, share and plan for 
the interplay of what we think we know about the future, and that which is yet uncertain. 
What underpins this is an assumption that, absent frameworks to think creatively about 
the future and what it might hold, exposure to unimagined risks and surprises increases.  
 
Scenarios are designed to stretch our thinking about the opportunities and threats that 
the future might hold, and to weigh those opportunities and threats carefully when 
making both short-term and long-term strategic decisions  
- (Scearce & Fulton, 2004) 
 
Strategic foresight encourages user involvement in shaping solutions to complex problems, 
provides shared vocabulary among stakeholders, supports robust consideration of 
alternatives, and shifts frames of reference to longer time horizons than standard strategic 
planning. Using scenarios in this context as thinking tools supports consideration of 
multiple factors simultaneously (Kahn, 1962; Kees van der Heijden, 1996). Advantages of 
using foresight in complex challenges include: 
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1) Increased understanding of key uncertainties 
2) Incorporation of alternative perspectives into planning, and  
3) Greater resilience of decisions to surprise.  
- from (Peterson, Cumming, & Carpenter, 2003) 
 
In many highly complex problem situations, standard tools used for optimal decision-
making6 lose their value because high uncertainty associated with the problems makes 
comparing and evaluating alternatives ineffective (Ludwig, 2002). When uncertainty is high, 
and level of control over variables is low, strategic foresight provides a framework for 
anticipating and adapting to coming changes. 
 
5.1 Foresight Process: Six-Step Framework 
 
Strategic foresight projects may include quantitative research, and almost always involve 
substantial qualitative data gathering and processing. Qualitative methods may include 
secondary research, interviews, surveys, and small or large group workshop-style steps such 
as brainstorming, sorting, ranking, and variations of other group input and feedback tools. 
Subject matter- or process-specific experts may be engaged in foresight projects on an 
individual level, through a Delphi7 process or as participants in groups. A project may also 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 An optimal decision is one such that no other available decision options lead to a better outcome. 
In order to compare different decision outcomes, relative utility is assigned to each of them. If there 
is uncertainty in what the outcome will be, the optimal decision maximizes the expected utility 
(utility averaged over all possible outcomes of a decision). From Wikipedia 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optimal_decision) 
7 Delphi here refers to a structured, interactive hybrid qualitative/quantitative research method that 
relies on a panel of experts responding to focus questions in repeated rounds 
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involve broader groups of stakeholders participating on various levels to generate, test 
and/or analyze and use scenarios.  
 
The process and approach vary depending on project goals but at a basic level a foresight 
process that uses scenarios involves roughly six steps that are iterative and interactive. 
While Peter Bishop and colleagues presented a thorough overview of various ways scenarios 
are developed, describing two dozen distinct techniques (Bishop et al., 2007), for the 
purposes of exploring ideas and supporting future discussion, this paper takes as a 
reference point what Bishop and colleagues suggested is the most common approach, with 
foundations in the scenario planning processes for business stemming from Royal 
Dutch/Shell and Global Business Networks (Bishop et al., 2007; P. Schwartz, 1991; Kees 
van der Heijden, 1996).  
 
A time-tested six-step version based on this classic process is outlined here. It should be 
familiar to practitioners of strategic foresight and scenario planning, providing a common 
touch point for further exploration and discussion. For illustrative purposes, the steps are 
presented in a linear fashion, while in reality the processes may not follow a straight path.  
 
5.1.1 Define the problem or domain  
In this stage, the project is clarified. Parameters are established to clarify who will 
participate and at what level, which may include a core team, facilitators, interviewees, and 
broader stakeholder participants. The focus question for the exploration of possible futures 
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is generated. Peterson et al (2003, p. 361) highlight that the “focal issue should emerge 
from a negotiations among participants in the planning process.” A core team and key 
stakeholders will be involved at this stage. Others may be involved depending on the 
specific project goals and type. 
 
5.1.2 Define the system  
Using the defined domain, participants in the process capture what is known, including 
mapping the (eco)system, linkages, influences, dynamics of the problem domain.  The 
problem definition may be redefined if the proposed question turns out to not be the right 
one once the problem domain is mapped onto its complex system. Internal and external 
environment scanning is conducted to better understand the current situation. Researchers, 
interviewers, facilitators, core team members, collaborators, key stakeholders, experts, and 
broader stakeholder groups may be engaged at this stage to generate, analyze and/or 
communicate information. 
 
5.1.3 Generate alternatives  
Horizon scanning may be used to explore what is known about the future of the system 
and its dynamics, as well as to identify deeper drivers that might influence the system over 
time. Information is analyzed and prioritized to establish key uncertainties or unknowns in 
the domain. From interactions among what is fairly certain about the future of the domain 
and what is identified as uncertain, a set of possible and plausible futures emerges. 
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Variations may include identifying criteria or principles of a desired future, and/or 
undesirable and status quo versions of the future. This step builds the matrix or frame for 
scenarios. This phase may also build a set of personae (amalgams or archetypes of people in 
the domain) for the following stages. Researchers, interviewers, facilitators, core team 
members, collaborators, key stakeholders, experts, and broader stakeholder groups may be 
engaged at this stage to generate, analyze and/or communicate information.  
 
5.1.4 Build scenarios  
The multiple scenarios should be provocative, unexpected, challenging, plausible, and 
internally consistent. They are often presented in narrative, and sometimes populated with 
personae to make the scenarios human-centred, vivid, and believable to stakeholders. The 
scenarios must have meaning for those who will use them. Contributors to this stage may 
include authors and/or designers or artists to generate and illustrate the scenarios in 
various media. 
 
5.1.5 Test for consistency, and refine  
Testing may involve quantitative validation, Delphi (expert) assessment, and review by 
clients and/or broader stakeholders. Depending on the goals and commissioning agents of 
the project, public consultation may be included. The aim is to ensure the scenarios have 
internal consistency and plausibility when confronted with real world users. A core team, 
facilitators, collaborators, researchers, expert contributors, and broader stakeholder may 
! 
35 
contribute at this stage. 
 
5.1.6 Test policies or strategies  
The scenarios may be used to consider strategic implications. They may be used to propose 
new strategies, or to test or analyze different options and assess how distinct actions might 
fare in different circumstances. In some cases, scenarios may be used to determine or 
improve resilience by identifying strategies or policies that thrive in all scenarios. In other 
projects, the aim is to maximize benefits by taking steps to manifest a desired future. 
Participation in this phase varies: it may be restricted to reports and/or presentations to 
internal users, clients or commissioning agents, or may include communication and 




Figure 3 - Six-Step Foresight Process 
Including Individual and Group Touch Points  
Figures by Kirk Clyne 
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5.2 Developing Scenarios 
Most scenarios are developed with human judgment playing a major role in informing and 
shaping them – this is the art part of taking a long view8. Scenarios vary in the rigour or 
consistency of their methodological underpinning, with many using a systems approach to 
provide a wireframe on which to hang intuition to produce a (semi-) replicable sense of 
direction. Almost all scenario development techniques described and categorized by Bishop, 
Hines and Collins (2007) require some stage of human input or feedback (brainstorming, 
mapping, proposing implications, weighing options) to develop the kernels that, once 
wrapped in narrative, become scenarios.  
 
That narrative, itself, is designed with human users in mind. Scenarios are typically crafted 
to resonate with human decision makers, using drama, narrative, and visualization to 
ensure the multiple futures are plausible, memorable and rendered on a human scale while 
simultaneously provoking users through elements that are discomfiting. With the stated 
purpose of supporting thinking about and imagining the future(s), the media that deliver 
these messages engage us at an emotional or affective level.  
 
5.3 Groups in Foresight  
Foresight projects typically engage small groups, and occasionally large ones. Groups in 
foresight range from a core team guiding the process, clients, key stakeholders or experts !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The Art of the Long View (P. Schwartz, 1991) and Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation 
(Kees van der Heijden, 1996) 
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providing input and/or feedback, to broader stakeholder or public consultations. The type 
and size of groups participating in a foresight project vary with the goals of the project. 
Much of the strategic foresight literature focuses on group elements of the process, and 
many scholars and practitioners emphasize that engaging stakeholders in a strategic 
foresight project is critical for building shared understanding through the process of 
scenario building (Bojer, Roehl, Knuth, & Magner, 2008; Kahane, 2012; Peterson et al., 
2003; K van der Heijden, Bradfield, Burt, Cairns, & Wright, 2002). In others projects, 
however, group elements are a component of the structure of the process, but are not 
central to the goals. Group engagement in such projects is more a means to an end, than 
an important end in itself. 
 
Regardless of the project goals, when people come together in groups, various social 
mechanisms come into play. Exploring these in depth is beyond the scope of this research, 
but there is substantial research on group dynamics both within foresight (and scenario 
planning in particular), and in complementary domains of inquiry.  
 
Among key understandings in studies of group interactions is a recognition that groups are 
complex. In what Clay Shirky refers to as “the grim logic of group complexity,” a group’s 
complexity increases faster than its actual size (2008, p. 28). As he illustrates, between two 
people, only one agreement is required, while to coordinate four people requires six 
agreements as everyone has to be aligned with each of the others. Accordingly, 
coordinating four people is potentially six times more challenging than seeking agreement 
between two participants. By the time 10 people are involved in the group, Shirky 
! 
39 
calculates, 45 different agreements are required to move forward. His example focuses on 
choosing a movie among a group of friends but lends some insight into the complexity of 
making decisions about higher consequence situations that affect many individuals.  
 
That foresight and scenario planning have been demonstrated to succeed in harnessing this 
complexity for group learning and strategic conversations is an achievement in its own 
right. What is less clearly defined and explored in the literature is the role of individuals in 
strategic foresight.  
 
5.4 Individuals in Foresight 
Although receiving much less attention than groups in the foresight and scenario planning 
literature, individuals provide input, feedback, facilitation and interpretation at each step 
of a strategic foresight project. Individuals in a project may include clients, facilitators, 
advisors, researchers, experts, authors, designers, interviewers and interviewees, and other 
stakeholders in the domain.  
 
Individuals come to, and participate in, group processes with established frameworks that 
inform what and how they see and don’t see. The content of these frameworks is unique to 
the individual, but many of the mechanisms that form these perceptions, and the shortcuts 
used to process information are fairly predictable phenomena that incline most people 




Since strategic foresight is typically an approach for grappling with uncertainty, the first 
question of this research project focuses on how individuals think and process information 
in uncertainty. 
 
6. Heuristics: Shortcuts for Decisions in Risk and 
Uncertainty  
A heuristic is just answering a difficult question by answering an easy one  
- Daniel Kahneman9  
Heuristics are simple and efficient rules and shortcuts for quickly and intuitively forming 
judgments, assessing probabilities and making decisions. These are broadly believed to be 
adaptive strategies from an evolutionary perspective, supporting instantaneous and efficient 
decision-making and synthesis of novel experience and information.  
 
While they are both normal and in many ways beneficial, as shortcuts, heuristics contribute 
to systematic deviations from human logic by cutting corners in information processing. 
Cognitive biases are the systematic errors that can result from such shortcuts10. Many of 
these systematic deviations have proven to be predictable since investigation into the 
phenomena began in earnest with Tversky and Kahneman in their Nobel-winning research 
into what they termed Prospect Theory. The original three heuristics they outlined were 
availability, representativeness and framing (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 In interview with legal scholar and colleague, Cass Sunstein (“Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman 
discusses life and work in behavioral economics,” 2014) 
10 Cognitive bias is distinguished here from social bias, or the shortcuts people use to quickly make 
sense of social situations, and interpret and understand other people and their actions 
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Kahneman, 1986). They later added the affect heuristic proposed by Slovic and colleagues. 
(Gilovich & Griffin, 2002; Slovic, 2007). To answer the first research question of this 
paper, “What informs and influences individual human decision-making in situations of 
uncertainty and risk?”, these phenomena and their implications for foresight projects will 
be explored further, below. 
 
Many identified heuristics factor into human perceptions of probabilities and risks. In 
addition to mental models of risk, for example, Paul Slovic and colleagues, who have been 
examining risk perception for 30 years, assert that our perceptions of risk are informed 
both by what we think about an activity or technology as well as how we feel about it. Slovic 
and colleagues added the affect heuristic, associated with an instantaneous positive or 
negative sensing, to the automatic human perceptions of risk (Fischhoff et al., 1979; Slovic 
et al., 2004, 1991). Predictably, when humans have preconceived positive feelings toward 
something, the tendency is to judge risks associated with the thing as low and benefits 
associated with it as high. The reverse also seems true in that something held in negative 
esteem will be judged as high risk with low benefits. The key insight here is that the 
affective response to a stimulus “comes prior to, and directs, judgments of risk and benefit” 
rather than being formed by risk assessment (Slovic et al., 2004, p. 315).  
 
Marx and Weber highlight that risks, then, are represented to us quickly and 
subconsciously as feelings experienced as an early warning system, as in a “gut reaction” 
(2012, pp. 102–3). Emotional responses to perceived risk or hazards, can and do diverge 
from the slower, cognitive, analytical evaluations of those same risks (Fischhoff et al., 1979; 
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Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2004). 
 
In their introduction to the foundational collection, Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now, 
Gilovich and Griffin categorize heuristics into “general purpose” heuristics, and more 
special-purpose heuristics, or those that have been added as discourse has matured into a 
robust inter- and cross- disciplinary inquiry (2002, p. 17).  
 
This paper highlights phenomena that surfaced within the earliest scope of this project – 
namely, an exploration of heuristics specific to environmental concerns and with possible 
implications for strategic foresight. From that reference point and the decision-making 
literature (in particular the literature specific to risk perception and judgment of 
probabilities), 22 articulated heuristics, biases, effects and fallacies with some impact on 
judgment of risk or decision-making in uncertainty emerged (see Table 1). Some of these 
are specialized phenomena, and others more general heuristics (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002).    
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Table 1 Cognitive Biases, Heuristics, Effects and Risk Perception 
 Phenomenon Described As 
1 Affect Perceptions of risk are influenced by whether they have 
(personal) positive or negative emotional associations 
2 Anchor and Adjust Tendency to rely too heavily on one piece of information when 
making decisions 
3 Asymmetry Principle When events are invisible or poorly defined, they carry little or no 
weight in shaping attitudes and opinions. When events are vivid, 
they carry disproportionate weight in forming judgments 
4 Availability Tendency to overestimate likelihood of events that have greater 
availability in memory. Tendency to ascribe undo importance to 
things that can be recalled 
5 Confirmation Bias Tendency to favour information that confirms existing beliefs  
6 Dread Risk Tendency to perceive risks as higher and benefits as lower for 
events that trigger dread (a visceral negative reaction)  
7 Endowment Effect Placing a higher value on goods one owns than those he/she 
does not 
8 Escalation of 
Commitment (Sunk Cost) 
Tendency to justify increased investment in a decision based on 
cumulative prior investment 
9 Finite Pool of Worry Theory states people have a limited capacity to worry so that as 
worry about one hazard increases, worry about other hazards 
decreases 
10 Framing Drawing different conclusions from the same information 
depending on how or by whom the information is presented 
11 Insufficient Reason  When people lack information about probabilities they act as if 
all probabilities are equally likely 
12 Introspection / 
Justification 
Thinking about reasons for a decision can interfere with decision 
making and lead to poor choices or undesired outcomes 
13 Loss Aversion Tendency to prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains 
14 Overconfidence Where confidence in judgments is greater than their accuracy, 
especially when confidence is high 
15 Proportion Dominance Attributes presented as a proportion / percentage of something, 
or as a probability are easier to assess or judge 
16 Psychic Numbing An inability to gauge change as the magnitude of stimulus 
increases 
17 Representativeness Tendency to judge or justify probabilities on the basis of 
resemblance 
18 Sensitivity to Small 
Changes 
High sensitivity to numbers and changes close to zero, and low 
sensitivity to large changes and those further from zero  
19 Single Action Bias Tendency to take a single action to mitigate threats even when 
a multi-pronged response would have clear advantages 
20 Status Quo Bias Preference for things to stay the same – where the current state 
is the baseline for loss aversion 
21 Trade-offs Tendency to avoid decisions altogether – even simple, low risk 
decisions – when faced with more than one attractive option  
22 Zero-risk bias Preference for reducing small risks to zero over a greater 
reduction in a larger overall risk 
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7. Heuristics and Strategic Foresight 
The aim of this project is to inform a redesign of strategic foresight approaches to account 
for and embrace insights into heuristics and cognitive biases in human decision-making. 
Toward this end, what follows is an exploration of the second research question: “How do 
these decision-making frameworks interplay with strategic foresight approaches to problem 
solving?” 
 
From the literature review and synthesis so far, it can be inferred that heuristics, and the 
biases to which they contribute, affect individual perceptions of risk and probability, while 
judgment and perception of risk and probability inform human decision-making and the 
ability to make “good” decisions. How might this be important for strategic foresight? To 
answer this – the second question – this inquiry turns to the touch points where individual 
judgments and decisions enter the strategic foresight space (see Six Step Process in Section 
5, and Figure 1).  
 
7.1 Prioritizing Heuristics: Comparative Analysis 
7.1.1 Concept Mapping and Ordering 
To prioritize the phenomena for this further investigation, this investigator applied concept 
mapping to organize the information along the following criteria: 
1) Clustered by association (including different terms for similar phenomenon) 
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2) Ordered hierarchically when a phenomenon was attributed/able in the literature 
to a higher order phenomenon, it was considered a lower (more specific) order 
(See Appendix A for the cascade diagram of this concept map) 
 
This process revealed six heuristics (the highest order) to which the other biases, effects and 
fallacies could be attributed (see Table 2 for details). These six are taken to be the priority 
phenomena for further investigation (presented alphabetically):  
• affect 
• anchor and adjust 
• availability 
• framing 
• loss aversion 
• representativeness 
 
Additionally, one anomaly emerged. The notion of “dread” risk that, although not 
considered a heuristic, contributed to several other phenomena, and also emerged as 
salient for its role in shaping public perceptions of risk in public policy decisions. In order 
to not lose the potential value to strategic foresight of insight into this outlier, dread risk is 
















1 Affect --- Broad 
2 Anchor and Adjust --- Broad 
3 Asymmetry Principle Dread, Affect Specific 
4 Availabi l i ty --- Broad 
5 Confirmation Bias Availability Specific 
6 Dread Risk11 Affect Broad 
7 Endowment Effect Loss Aversion Specific 
8 Escalation of Commitment /  Sunk Costs) Loss Aversion Specific 
9 Finite Pool of Worry Affect, Dread Specific 
10 Framing --- Broad 
11 Insufficient Reason  Framing, Anchor, Affect Specific 
12 Introspection / Justification Availability, Framing Specific 
13 Loss Aversion --- Broad 
14 Overconfidence Availability Specific 
15 Proportion Dominance 
Representativeness, 
Anchor Specific 
16 Psychic Numbing Dread, Affect Specific 
17 Representativeness --- Broad 
18 Sensitivity to Small Changes 
Anchor, 
Representativeness Specific 
19 Single Action Bias Dread, Affect Specific 




22 Zero-risk bias Anchor Specific 
 
When a phenomenon was attributed/able in the literature to a higher (broader or more 
more general) order phenomenon, it was considered a lower (more specific) order. Those 
classified here as Broad phenomena were not attributable in the literature to other 
phenomena, and were prioritized for further investigation. The Specific phenomena appear 
in Appendix B. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 “Dread” risk is not considered a heuristic, so it is not highest level in the order; however, it 
contributes specifically to many of the phenomena and themes that emerged in the environmental 




7.2 Priority Heuristics  
The heuristics that emerged from the resource review and coding, and concept mapping 
are described (alphabetically) in greater detail here. (For descriptions of the remaining 
phenomena, see Appendix B.) The underlying assumption here is that if practitioners of 
foresight can account for the higher order, more general phenomena in scenario planning 
approaches, the associated lower order (more specialized) phenomena will be similarly 
accounted for.  
 
7.2.1 Affect Heuristic  
Emotions circumvent rational cost-benefit analysis.  - Daniel Kahneman12 
 
All images in our personal experiences are tagged subconsciously with an affect, a sense of 
goodness or badness, or a potential to cause pleasure or pain (Slovic et al., 2004, p. 314), 
and we tap into this store of affective impressions when making judgments (Finucane et al., 
2000). Because the affective system of information processing is faster than the reflective 
system, judgments are formed first by affect. One outcome of this Affect Heuristic is 
insensitivity to probabilities when potential future outcomes are linked to a strong affective 
meaning (good or bad). In such circumstances we fall prey to a sense of possibility rather 
than probability (Slovic et al., 2004).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 (“Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman discusses life and work in behavioral economics,” 2014) 
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7.2.2 Anchoring and Adjusting 
In Anchoring and Adjusting (aka Anchoring, or Adjusting from an Anchor) people use an 
initial piece of information to make subsequent judgments. Further judgments are adjusted 
from this established anchor, or reference point (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This is a 
particularly pervasive phenomenon. Studies by Kahneman and others (Gilovich & Griffin, 
2002) have found that even when research subjects are informed of the anchoring effect 
and its impact on their choices they still show limited ability to avoid it. Financial 
incentives are similarly unlikely to shift participants away from the strong hold of an 
anchor. Anchoring factors into negotiation strategies since participants in a negotiation are 
likely to anchor and adjust from the opening offers in the negotiation. Sunstein suggests 
that a related lower order phenomenon, the Status Quo Bias, is the specific manifestation 
whereby the baseline against which events are adjusted is the present state (2007, pp. 131–
2) (see Appendix B for the Status Quo Bias).  
 
7.2.3 Availability  
Availability suggests that if something can be recalled, it will be given undue significance 
when predicting the likelihood of other events. Additionally, the ease of recall influences 
predictions of the likelihood or frequency of occurrence: if something is easily recalled, it 
may be perceived as more common or more likely to occur (Bradfield, 2008; Sunstein, 
2005; Weber, 2006).  Additionally, events are more available the more recently they have 
been experienced. This effect can disproportionately affect estimations of rare events, since 
these are by nature less likely to have occurred in recent memory. By contrast, if a rare 
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event has occurred recently, its likelihood of occurring in general will be overestimated. 
The Affect Heuristic may be responsible for the observed phenomenon that memories 
seem to be more available if or because they are associated with an emotional impact or 
positive or negative mental images (Marx & Weber, 2012, p. 109). Because of this 
emotional component, Slovic et al (Slovic, 2007) have suggested that much of what has 
been attributed to Availability may be better understood through the Affect Heuristic. 
 
By contrast, suppressing this rapid affective system by “thinking too hard” can also impair 
judgment: research by Wilson and Schooler (1991) demonstrated through various studies 
that the quality (compared against experts) of decision-making was affected negatively by 
asking decision makers to think about the advantages and disadvantages of their options 
prior to making a choice. The researchers concluded that thinking about pros and cons of 
decisions created distractions in the choice process by focusing attention on “non-optimal 
criteria” to the extent that individuals based their decisions at least in part on those criteria 
(Wilson & Schooler, 1991).13 
 
7.2.4 Dread Risk  
Studies showed that feelings of dread were the major determiner of public perception 
and acceptance of risk for a wide range of hazards 
- (Fischhoff et al., 1979; Slovic et al., 2004). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 see Introspection and Justification, and Trade-Offs in Appendix B 
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Dread Risk is a subcategory of Affect. When Slovic and colleagues (1997) explored affective 
evaluations of risk, their research found perceptions of risk may have little grounding in 
consequences or their probabilities. Instead, they, and Weber (2006) identified two types of 
factors that people sense which inform risk perception: dread-related risks and other risks. 
Their research suggests a sense of dread is related to a perceived lack of control or fairness, 
involuntariness, and a potential for catastrophic impact of an event. Thinking about these 
types of hazards (nuclear reactor accidents, for example) trigger immediate physiological 
responses including accelerated heart rate. Risks in the “other” category do not trigger 
these anxiety responses. 
 
Marx and Weber (Marx & Weber, 2012; Weber, 2006) cite additional research that delves 
into this two-factor hypothesis specifically around climate change and perceptions of risk. 
The findings suggest when people perceive climate change as a gradual shift over a long 
time frame, there is a sense the risks are knowable and controllable - or at least that they 
afford time to adapt. By contrast, when climate change is perceived as potentially abrupt 
with unpredictable and catastrophic shifts, people are triggered on a more emotional and 
dread-inducing level. Level of dread in this case seems to correlate directly with willingness 
to act to mitigate risk. 
 
In another illustrative example, researchers found people are willing to pay more to avoid 
emotionally laden hazards. Sunstein (2007) cites an example from Loewenstein (2001) 
wherein research subjects were willing to pay more for flight insurance to cover losses from 
“terrorism” exclusively than for insurance to cover losses resulting from “all causes”. This 
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defies logical reasoning but can be explained by Affect and Dread Risk in that “all risk” 
does not trigger dread, while “terrorism”, by definition and in practice, does. 
 
Dread Risk may partially account for Single Action Bias,14 the tendency to take only a 
single action to mitigate threats. Even when a multi-pronged response would have clear 
advantages, people are inclined to engage in only a single mitigating action. Research by 
Marx and Weber (2012) suggests this may be because that one step removes the “hazard 
flag” – or mitigates the sense of dread – that provoked a response. 
 
7.2.5 Framing  
Framing is the tendency to draw different conclusions from the same information 
depending on how or by whom the information is presented (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). In particular, people tend to 
respond differently to choices depending on whether they are presented as a loss or as a 
gain. The tendency is to avoid risk when a positive (gain) frame is presented but seek risks 
when a negative (loss) frame is presented.  Additionally, when an attribute is presented as a 
probability, it is perceived as more benign and less compelling than when the same 
information is framed as relative frequency, (Slovic et al., 2004).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 See Appendix B 
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7.2.6 Loss Aversion  
Loss Aversion and the well-known Endowment Effect15 refer to the tendencies described in 
Prospect Theory to experience losses as more significant than gains (Gilovich & Griffin, 
2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In other words, losses hurt more than gains satisfy us 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).  Kahneman and colleagues have demonstrated repeatedly 
that once subjects have a thing, even with a money back guarantee, returning it is 
experienced as a loss. Loss Aversion can lead to greater regret for outcomes of actions than 
of inaction (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). A related lower order phenomenon, the Status 
Quo Bias, is the specific manifestation whereby the status quo is the baseline against which 
we measure gains and losses, so that a loss against the status quo is perceived as more bad 
than a gain from the status quo seems good (Sunstein, 2007, pp. 131–2).  
 
From both Tversky and Kahneman (1986) and Schwartz (2004) we learn that in situations 
with uncertainty or risk, people are inclined to prefer small, certain gains over larger less 
certain ones. Along the same lines, people are inclined to risk substantial possible losses to 
avoid small, certain ones. 
 
7.2.7 Representativeness 
The Representativeness Heuristic (aka the Similarity Heuristic) is the tendency to assign 
probability to uncertain events based on how similar those events are to one’s mental map 
and understanding of causation within that map (Bradfield, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 See Appendix B !
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1979). The tendency is to judge something as belonging to a class based on a few salient 
characteristics without accounting for the base rates (probabilities) of those characteristics. 
The more representative a thing is of a “parent” or prototype, the more likely people are to 
exaggerate probability of its occurrence despite the fact representativeness (being closer to 
an available stereotype) does not make it more likely. Representativeness leads to false logic 
that ignores probabilities, and a perception that random occurrences are causal patterns 




The Asymmetry Principle posits it is easier to lose or destroy trust than to build it. 
Slovic (1997) highlighted that incidents that damage trust are usually clearly defined. 
They are events or moments that are noticeable and noted (the Availability 
Heuristic), while the types of things that build trust are not easily observable. He gives 
this example:  
 
“How many positive events are represented by the safe operation of a nuclear 
power plant for one day? Dozens of events? Hundreds? When events are invisible or 
poorly defined, they carry little or no weight in shaping our attitudes and 
opinions” (1997, p. 302). 
 
Slovic’s research suggests trust-destroying events have a disproportionate impact on 
perception of probability and risk. This is an adaptive mechanism, given that learning 
quickly what not to trust can improve chances of survival. In simple problems, the 
heuristic is clearly advantageous (eg. How likely is a bear to attack while it fishes for 
salmon?); however, in more complex problems it may contribute to errors in 
assessment of probability (eg. What should be done with nuclear waste?). 
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Narrative 4 -  Experiential  Judgment and Decis ion -Making  
 
The 2011 Tohuku East  Japan earthquake and resu l t ing  t sunami caused a 
var ie ty  o f  fa i lures  at  the  Fukushima Daiichi  Nuclear  Power P lant which 
resu l ted in  radioact ive  emiss ions  to  the  atmosphere .  The earthquake 
occurred on March 11th at  14:26 Japan Standard Time ( JST) ,  the t sunami 
about one hour later  at  15:41,  and by 16:36 a nuclear  emergency 
 was reported .  By the ear ly  morning hours  o f  March 12th,  radioact ive  
emiss ions  were  occurr ing f rom the p lant .  
 
-  From http://sos.noaa.gov/Datasets/dataset.php?id=332 
 
Is burying nuclear waste 1 km from one of the largest fresh water lakes in the world a good idea? 
 
Figure 4 Fukushima 





The map in Figure 416 models the maximum wave amplitudes of the Tohoku tsunami following the 
March 11, 2011 Honshu earthquake in Japan. This version of the image without labels has been 
circulated and interpreted widely as a map of radiation dissemination from the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Station that was crippled during the earthquake and tsunami events. When presented 
in such a context, the dramatic, vivid map is experientially coded with an enduring and, likely, dread-
inducing association. The visceral impact of the first encounter with the image is difficult to undo or 
re-code with additional information or analysis. 
 
Images like this, news stories and blogs of the devastating and dangerous Fukushima Daiichi story 
have been widely available for the three years since the natural disaster and nuclear meltdown. They 
are so common it is hard to imagine someone in North America not having heard or seen them. And 
they are vivid enough it is unlikely they have not left viewers affected with strong (presumably) 
negative and visceral associations. The Fukushima Daiichi story is recent, vivid, and dread-inducing, 
making it highly available to recall.  
 
High availability and dread associations are likely to be a broadly-shared reference point. In the small 
Kincardine township where one third of the community works at the nuclear power plant, and where 
everyone draws drinking water from the lake or local wells, it is almost guaranteed these stories would 
have caught the attention of community members, policy makers and technical specialists in the field, 
alike. The story continues to appear regularly in news cycle, reinforcing earlier images and associations, 
and keeping them fresh, powerful and anxiety-producing. 
 
In future considerations related to nuclear power or radioactivity in Kincardine and elsewhere, this 
case will provide a common reference point that may affect the risk perceptions of anyone touching the 
issue.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Model amplitudes calculated with the MOST forecast model. Filled colors show maximum 
computed tsunami amplitude in cm during 24 hours of wave propagation. Black contours show 
computed tsunami arrival time.  http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/honshu20110311/ 
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7.3 Heuristics In Judgment and Perceptions of Risk !
Having inferred the hierarchical order of the effects in the concept map (see Table 2, and 
Appendix A) and through this process selected the seven effects of greatest significance for 
this inquiry, the phenomena were further explored by: 
• Coding for predictability of the direction of the bias, and 
• Coding for predictability of the reference point of the bias 
 
The level of certainty with which the direction of the effect and the reference point(s) for 
the ensuing bias vary in their predictability, with the higher order phenomena varying in 
predictability of the direction and reference point of bias. By contrast, at least some of the 
lower order effects not brought forward in this discussion share the characteristic that both 
direction and reference point are known or knowable. In Zero Risk Bias18, for example, 
which refers to the tendency to prefer reducing a small risk to zero even when this distracts 
from having a more statistically significant impact by choosing a greater reduction of a 
larger risk, both the direction of the effect and its reference point can be discerned.  
Similarly, in Status Quo Bias19, defined as a preference for things to stay the same, and for 
using the current state as the reference point, both the direction of the effect and its 
reference point can be discerned.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 See Appendix B 
19 See Appendix B!
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From this exploration of the higher order phenomena, three distinct patterns emerged that 
can be applied toward the third question of how to improve foresight by incorporating 
insights into individual decision-making: 
1) Where the direction is predictable but the reference point is complex or difficult to 
know 
2) Where the direction is difficult to predict but the reference point can be known 
3) Where the direction is difficult to predict and the reference point is difficult to 
know 
Each category has implications for strategic foresight projects. They are explored further 
here, below. 
 
7.3.1 Predictability of Direction of Bias from a Reference Point 
Many of the phenomena have a predictable direction of bias from a reference point. For 
example, some heuristics contribute consistently toward over-estimating probabilities, while 
others shift perceptions toward under-estimations.  
 
The impacts on judgment and perceptions of probability and risk identified with the 
priority heuristics were outlined, then coded by the investigator for the level of 
predictability  (coded low, medium or high) in a foresight setting of such shifts. The key 
coding question was: If a reference point were known, how likely is it in a foresight setting 
that the direction of impact on judgment of the bias could be discerned? 
See Table 3 for a summary. 
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7.3.2 Predictability of Reference Point 
While the direction of shift in perception of risk or probability is predictable in many cases, 
how predictable is the reference point or static position for this shift? Predictability of the 
reference point was coded here based on several criteria: 
• Along a continuum of universality to individuality (high-low) 
• Whether or not the reference point can be established by the foresight process, 
itself (high-low). 
 
Where the reference point is expected to be universal and consistent across individuals or 
domains, the reference point was coded as having high predictability. Where the reference 
point is established by and within the foresight process, it was coded as having high 
predictability. With phenomena where a reference point is highly individualistic and/or 
heavily grounded in individual experience outside the foresight setting, the predictability 
was coded as low. In some cases, the predictability of the reference point varied by context 
– these were coded as medium.  
 










Implications of a predictable shift and identifiable reference point are discussed in the 














Affect Insensitivity to probabilities when affect is 
strong (either positive or negative) 
Medium Low 
Anchor and Adjust Tendency not to shift far from an anchor in 
any direction 
High High 
Availability When events are easy to recall probability is 
exaggerated. Probability of rare events is 
under-estimated unless there is recent 
experience of the event, in which case 
probability is exaggerated 
High Low 
Dread Risk The higher the dread associated with event, 
the higher its perceived risks and lower its 
perceived benefits 
High Medium 
Framing Tendency to avoid risk when a frame is 
positive, and prefer risks when negative 
High High 
Loss Aversion Preference for small, certain gains over large 
uncertain ones, and large, uncertain losses 
over small certain ones 
High Medium 
Representativeness Tendency to exaggerate probability when 





The aim of this investigation is to provide recommendations for improving foresight 
approaches by incorporating transdisciplinary insights from the domains of individual 
human decision-making and judgments in situations of uncertainty and risk to current 
foresight frameworks. Having established that heuristics and related biases have substantial 
and predicable influences on individual perceptions of risk and judgment of probabilities, 
this paper turns now to the questions of 1) the impact of these phenomena on strategic 
foresight practice, and 2) recommendations for improving strategic foresight frameworks 
through these insights. 
The discussion and recommendations presented below use two primary perspectives to 
support this integration toward improved strategic foresight frameworks: the first aligns 
implications of heuristics with project goals, and the second with a standard six-step process 
as outlined in Section 5 and Figure 3. 
!
8.1 Project Goals 
The impact of heuristics and biases on strategic foresight projects will vary according to the 
aims of the project per the three-type typology outlined by Borjeson and colleagues that 




8.1.1 Predictive scenarios  
Predictive scenario projects ask what will happen if…? Whatever is placed after the “if” in 
this framework establishes the anchor for the remaining query. Any further foresight 
investigation in such a process will be fettered to this reference point, and adjustments 
from this anchor are anticipated to be incremental in scope and scale. This is true of both 
tools that build from the present toward the future(s), and those, like backcasting, that set 
an anchor in a far future and work backward strategically.  Foresight exercises can shift the 
anchors through intentional and repeated cycles so participants adjust from a different set 
of reference points, but in each cycle participants will still be bound to the anchors once 
they are in place. 
 
Similarly, the stated “if” establishes a status quo for the project against which losses and 
gains will be measured. A subconscious tendency to preserve this starting point is likely to 
remain at play for whatever exploration follows, with participants influenced by a tendency 
to avoid losses associated with this reference point (even if the status quo is considered 
imperfect) over any gains that might be explored.  
 
Whether the framing of this reference is positive or negative will also influence the 
decisions that can be considered. Knowing that predictable tendencies in decision-making 
lead people to avoid risks when the frame is positive and to seek risks when the frame is 
negative although the information presented is the same20 should inform choices 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 For example, patients tend to make different choices when a physician presents the survival rates 
of an operation versus the rates of adverse outcomes of the same procedure, even though the 
information is the same regardless of this framing. 
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practitioners make when framing the project and information communicated to any 
participants.  
 
Note that anchoring and framing effects impact both expert and non-expert judgments. 
Both effects are difficult to mitigate. 
 
8.1.2 Exploratory scenarios 
To consider what might or could happen across long timelines, and to consider substantial 
(rather than just incremental) shifts requires the type of expansive thinking commonly 
associated with strategic foresight. In such projects, an overt aim is to liberate thinking and 
decision-making from the bonds and boundaries of the present. Anchors, then, are 
particularly limiting to this type of project. Given that adjusting from an anchor is a 
tenacious effect that limits true expansive thinking and imagining, a process that simulates 
such liberation may be a reasonable expectation of foresight. Recognizing that each cycle 
may not be able to free thinkers from an anchor, but can establish new ones adjusted from 
previous reference points, it is worth considering that carefully facilitated and repeated 
cycles of establishing and adjusting anchors could produce an effect consistent with these 
aims.  
 
As in predictive scenarios, insights into anchoring and framing should be thoughtfully 
considered to achieve alignment with specific project objectives. Since the framing of 
information can influence whether subsequent choices are risk-seeking or risk-averse, for 
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example, practitioners should consider the likelihood that a neutral exploration may not be 
possible, and account for this in project design.  
 
Horizon scans that typically inform exploratory scenarios may be prone to the impacts of 
affect and dread risks. This is true of researchers, facilitators, and core team members, as 
well as informants who contribute inputs to the framework of an exploratory project. The 
predictable effect demonstrated by Slovic and colleagues’ extensive research into dread and 
other perceptions of risk is that individuals have a tendency to avoid or under- represent 
events that do not trigger a visceral or dread reaction, while over-representing elements that 
do have a strong negative affect. This is a salient insight for researchers scanning for signals 
and trends, as well as for contributors who render scenarios in various media. At both of 
these points in the foresight process, affect may skew what is noticed, ignored or privileged 
and moved forward in the process. 
 
While reference points for affect are individual, complex, multivariate, and not established 
within the framework of the foresight project in the way anchors and framing can be, they 
may yet be knowable in a useful way. Depending on project objectives and the focus 
question, it may be useful and reasonable to scan for elements or events that are associated 
with a strong affective response across the domain. Since affect is demonstrated to precede 
and shape assessment of benefits and risks, affective associations have a substantial impact 
on subsequent judgments. Scanning for known triggers that may cause friction in the 




Affect has also been demonstrated to impact the availability heuristic. Along these lines, 
what is available (recently experienced and/or powerfully associated and therefore easily 
recalled) may be overestimated, or ascribed undo importance. In exploratory projects, this 
phenomenon may impact the process at any touch point where individuals are engaged (see 
Figure 3), including in scans, and steps to make sense of data. 
 
8.1.3 Normative scenarios 
The goals of normative projects are to preserve or to transform. Both share a stage in the 
process that establishes a target or desired future. Normative projects, then, have two anchor 
points – one in the present, and one in the desired future. The present anchor will 
establish the status quo and the baseline against which losses and gains will be assessed in 
the present. As with predictive scenarios, there will be a tendency to preserve this starting 
point regardless of known flaws, with participants tending to avoid losses from this 
reference point. This friction, predictably, will be disproportionate to the assessment of any 
anticipated gains.  
 
Choosing a desired future typically involves an exploratory phase to generate and assess 
options toward identifying the elements, criteria or principles that inform the desired 
future state. The considerations outlined for exploratory projects hold for normative ones, 
as well, during this phase of the project.  
 
Unique to normative projects is the establishment of a second, future anchor that will 
establish its own reference points and associated biases. Once this point is identified, 
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participants may experience an aversion to any perceived losses related to the desired future, 
even as more information or options with better outcomes emerge. This may contribute to 
a strong pull among participants in the process toward aligning choices and actions with 
the future reference point. It may also create challenges for strategies where pivoting is 
required. The more vivid the future reference point, the greater the anticipated effects of 
most of these biases.  
 
Some normative projects involve steps for reconciling or bridging the two anchor points. 
As in exploratory projects, this objective may require repeated cycles to incrementally adjust 
from and reset anchors to create conditions that support creative problem solving in the 
horizon between the two anchors.  
 
Embedded in normative projects, then, are all of the considerations and recommendations 
for both predictive and exploratory scenarios. 
 
8.2  Six-Step Framework 
Additional considerations emerged for improving the standard six-step framework outlined 
in Section 5 (see Figure 3). Most important to these is the recognition that individuals 
factor into the process at all stages and that, regardless of their expertise, level of experience, 
or role in the project, these individuals will be influenced by heuristics, including those 




Facilitators, researchers and core team members will be impacted by cognitive biases that 
influence what they notice and/or dismiss throughout the process. For example, affect 
(especially dread associations) and availability biases will impact what individuals identify – 
what signals they see – in horizon scans. Similarly, environment scans, SWOT analyses and 
other background or preparation materials provided by clients or commissioning agents 
will have affect and availability biases embedded in them. Events or elements that have 
occurred recently, are easily recalled, are vivid, or associated with strong positive or negative 
emotions will typically be over-represented in such materials.  
 
In project steps that generate alternatives and consider known elements and uncertainties, 
individuals engaged in the process will assign personal probabilities and interpretations of 
risk in their assessments of the information. Particular attention should be given to the role 
of the affect heuristic at this phase, including: 1) the tendency to over-represent dread risks 
and under-represent associated benefits, 2) the tendency to under-represent events that 
don’t evoke dread, and 3) the tendency to downplay risks and over estimate benefits of 
events with positive affect.  
 
8.3 Compressing the Process 
In a compressed foresight process, or one that is conducted rapidly to accommodate short 
project timelines, efficiencies may emerge from taking shortcuts by tapping into existing 
frameworks and content. This is inconsistent with foresight projects that require 




While quick and intuitive thinking is not inherently problematic, it can contribute to 
systematic errors in judgment and assessments of probability, risk and uncertainty. As 
highlighted in this research, many of these effects are predictable; however, such 
predictability only has value if the insights are applied in a real life setting. The value of 
knowing and predicting cognitive biases lies in accounting and compensating for them.  
 
How do we apply reason to temper the strong emotions engendered by some risk events? 
On the other hand, how do we infuse needed “doses of feeling” into circumstances 
where lack of experience may otherwise leave us too “coldly rational”?  
- (Slovic et al., 2004, p. 311) 
 
A compressed project may not allocate appropriate resources (both time and human 
resources) toward compensating for these known effects.  
 
The second challenge is that exploratory models rely on expansive thought to achieve stated 
project goals. As outlined above, achieving this expansive effect may require repeated touch 
points, cycles, or iterations to continually reestablish new anchors and ultimately achieve 
an end state that is far enough from the starting reference point to be of value. Anchoring 
and adjusting is a tenacious heuristic that impacts experts and non-experts, alike, with no 
established mitigation strategies. A strategic foresight process of multiple cycles may offer a 




Foresight projects with normative (preserving or transforming) objectives, and three-
horizons models, insofar as they rely on an exploratory phase to surface options or criteria 
from which a desired future can be articulated, are similarly bound by these constraints.  
 
Predictive projects may be more amenable to a compressed process since they tend to be 
less exploratory. The objectives of such projects may be better aligned with incremental 





Narrative 5 -  The Futures of  Radioact ive Material  in Ontario:  
An Imagined Foresight Project  
 
A foresight project around nuclear waste disposal with implications for Kincardine might unfold 
something like the following imagined process. Only a few of the many touch points in the process are 
highlighted here, leaving room for the reader to explore the scenario and implications of this research 
through his or her own experience and lens.  !
Imagine that to help focus and direct current policy decisions in Ontario’s nuclear energy sector, a 
branch or agency of the provincial government commissions a strategic foresight project exploring long-
term implications of and strategies for managing the non-energy outputs (currently known as “waste”) 
of Ontario’s nuclear energy generation industries. If it were triggered specifically by discord and 
impasse over proposed strategies for storing the current reserves of nuclear waste, the project might be 
designed to test outcomes of one or more policy decisions – a “what if…” style study. A project designed 
to generate rather than test policy options, however, would be more exploratory in nature, with a likely 
focus on facilitating strategic thinking and dialogue around what might or could unfold that would 
have implications for the domain. Such a project might be designed to surface both risks and 
opportunities over a long timeline, and would look beyond the currently defined nuclear energy sector.  
 
Background materials produce by various technical experts prior to commencement of the project 
would be largely analytical, and presented as assessments of “real” or empirical risks and probabilities 
devoid of affective or experiential influences. Direct risks and probabilities (mortality and morbidity, or 
jobs and taxes lost or generated, for example) would predominate. These materials would form an 
anchor for future discussions, with initial explorations clustering around the concepts introduced by 
these materials (adjusting from an anchor heuristic).  
 
In a horizon scan or STEEPV23 survey, what researchers notice or overlook will be influenced by the 
availability and affect heuristics. Dread, in particular, will contribute toward perceptions of risks that 
are far higher than statistical probabilities of such occurrences. Rare events generate particularly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 STEEPV is an acronym for Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental, Political, and Values, and is a 
common framework for structuring horizon scanning activities 
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strong signals in this regard. Accordingly, the recent story and images of the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear plant meltdown and radiation leak, which are likely to be available in the recall of most 
researchers on the foresight team as well as any participants or informants in the project, will 
introduce a distracting signal. Awareness of this catastrophe (availability heuristic) and the vivid, 
negative, and anxiety-triggering emotional coding of the event (affect heuristic, and dread) will tend to 
skew risk perceptions, and may distract from equally- or more likely possibilities and signals that 
generate lower recall or a neutral emotional response.  
 
While knowledge of the Fukushima disaster may introduce to the information gathering and analysis 
phases of this project an exaggerated perception of risks or probabilities from natural disasters (and 
systemic human errors in planning for such possibilities), lack of recall or dread associated with other 
elements may result in an under-representation of other possibilities. In other words, less dramatic 
events may be overlooked by researchers and informants. Mundane possibilities, such as a broken door 
mechanism, or a small fire may not be noticed as possible factors in an environmental or horizon scan 
or systems mapping exercise. Such oversights of quotidian elements can have dramatic implications, 
however; both a malfunctioning door awaiting repairs, and a fire onboard a truck below ground were 
factors in two separate high-risk incidents (including a radiation leak that has temporarily disabled 
operations) at the nuclear Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico in February of this year.  
 
Similarly, a lack of drama – or dread – may influence strategy and policy decisions. While we may 
attempt to assess such risks and probabilities rationally and analytically, we are fundamentally 
designed to act on more affective, experiential information. It is easy to imagine grasping critical 
uncertainties related to potential radioactive air leaks or watershed contamination from a deep 
geologic repository, for example. It may be more difficult to get a strategy team equally excited about 
chronic low-level exposure to background radiation from radon naturally released from soil and well 
water. While a nuclear waste accident triggers a predictable visceral response in most readers, a 
colourless, odourless gas released by decomposing soil may not. The latter may also be less compelling 
for project team members to render visually or in narrative scenarios. Yet radon exposure is the second 
leading cause of lung cancer in North America, with a relatively high probability for most residents of 
Ontario. Should it be ignored in an exploration of risks and opportunities related to radioactive 
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materials? If something triggers dread, it is more likely to get managed than something that is 
emotionally neutral.  
 
Radiation exposure stemming from radon versus nuclear waste also provides an interesting example for 
noting some differences in risk perception frameworks of experts and non-experts in a domain. 
Statistically, the risk of mortality or morbidity from radon is much higher than that of an accident 
related to nuclear waste storage, since radon is a certainty in the environment across the continent, 
while a nuclear accident is a high-impact but low-probability event. To put this in perspective, radon 
exposure in the United States accounts for approximately 21,000 lung cancer deaths24 per year (US 
EPA), while the Fukushima meltdown has so far resulted in one known death, with future deaths 
from related cancers for those living in the region predicted as low to none (Brumfiel, 2013). A 
Health Canada report on household radon exposure reports over 11% of homes in the Grey-Bruce 
region of Ontario, where the town of Kincardine and the Bruce nuclear plant are located, have 
household levels of radon above safe levels established by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(Health Canada, 2012). So a case could be made for including radon in such a discussion. 
 
An expert perspective on such risks might focus on mortality impacts and (possibly) on cost-benefit 
analysis of potential interventions.  From a lay perspective, risks from a nuclear accident are assessed 
as human-caused and therefore avoidable and unfair, as well as irreversible. These characteristics 
contribute to a high dread response that demands attention to reduce fear triggers (Slovic et al, 2004). 
Risks from radon, by contrast, are naturally occurring, ambient and, therefore, considered unavoidable. 
They are not irreversible in the sense that known and widely available mitigating strategies can reduce 
potential for harm. Radon, then, falls into a low-dread category of risk that can be ignored more easily 
than a nuclear accident. Such a scenario is likely to generate disconnects between expert and lay 
perspectives of risk and willingness to act. 
 
Other phases of this imaginary foresight project may also be influenced by the impact of heuristics. 
Imagine a stage in the project involving small groups. In this scenario, it is possible such group sessions 
would be regional consultations held at different times across the province, with each session hosting !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 The US Environmental Protection Agency contrasts this figure with 17,400 preventable deaths per year 
associated with drunk driving, and 2,800 resulting from house fires 
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several tables of participants, each with a facilitator and note taker. The facilitation team may be 
aligned in terms of core objectives of the project and sessions, as well as what information to provide to 
the groups, but they likely vary in terms of managing the process within their own break-out groups.  
 
When analyzing the information gathered at these sessions, the team might notice that one group or 
region appeared to be bold, ambitious and visionary in their contributions and discussion, while 
another seemed conservative, nostalgic and fearful of change. It is possible such differences could be 
cultural, regional, or specific to a culture of practice (for expert consultations). It is also possible the 
differences result from variations in the ways information was presented by facilitators (the framing 
heuristic). For example, presenting information with a positive or negative frame will influence risk-
seeking and risk-avoiding behaviours in predictable directions. In decision-making, people tend to avoid 
risks when information is presented with a positive frame (e.g. when presented with survival rates of a 
surgical intervention) and seek risks when the same information is presented with a negative frame 
(e.g. presented with rates of adverse outcomes of the same operation). So the effect noted by the 
foresight team may be natural variation, or it may be a predictable result of information framing. The 
significance of this effect will vary with project aims. In this scenario, one community may appear 
eager to host a storage facility for nuclear waste and another more reluctant; however, these 
perceptions may actually be artefacts of choices made by the core team. Analysis, and policy or 
strategy decisions based on this information could be misdirected.  
 
Each of the priority heuristics outlined in the paper and those in Appendix B carry their own 
implications. This narrative provides just a sample of implications of heuristics and cognitive biases in 
a foresight project as a starting point for further thinking and strategic discussion. 
 




Part of the promise of strategic foresight is an inherent capacity of the approach to 
overcome individual biases and limits to expansive thinking.  In order to manifest this 
promise, practitioners must be aware of the impacts of cognitive biases in strategic foresight 
frameworks. Applying a lens based in heuristics and cognitive biases, for example, raises the 
possibility that, instead of liberating thinking, a foresight process will introduce different but 
equally tenacious anchors that may limit subsequent expansive thinking. Similarly, 
decisions made throughout the foresight process establish frames that determine and have 
embedded within them how individuals will tend to react when applying information in 
subsequent steps.  As foresight practitioners, we need to consider such effects and align 
them with project objectives, approaches and methods. The following are additional 
recommendations that emerged from this research and analysis for applying behavioural 
insights to improve foresight frameworks. !!
9.1 The Project Team!!
Cognitive biases will shape the judgments of technical, subject-matter and process experts 
and non-experts, alike, in assessing potential impact of events as well as the likelihood of 
their occurring. These biases will also influence what individuals notice and highlight in 
environment and horizon scans. One step toward improving foresight frameworks, then, 
lies in factoring these insights into assembling the project team.  It is worth identifying 
strategies that can mitigate or compensate for the effects of heuristics and associated biases 
among core team members, facilitators, researchers, and contributors (authors, artists, 
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graphic designers) throughout the project.  
  
For those steps in the process where reference points are introduced by the project team, 
process facilitators should be aware of the biases they are introducing with the aim of 
crafting these with intention. This is true in particular of establishing anchors and frames 
when developing and presenting materials, preparing interview questions, facilitating 
groups sessions, and facilitating other information gathering and processing steps. For 
example, in project stages that involve multiple small groups for input or information 
processing, the project team may want to determine in advance whether there is value to 
having facilitators frame small group sessions consistently across all groups, or intentionally 
introduce different frames and anchors across the groups. The first strategy would support 
comparison across groups, while the latter might establish a type of diversity by introducing 
different starting points for small group discussions.  
 
9.2 Desired Futures 
When working with frameworks that articulate a desired future, it is valuable to note that 
establishing a desired future can generate a strong pull toward that reference point 
regardless of new information or emerging options. The more vividly this desired future 
scenario is rendered, the greater the effect of many heuristics and associated biases. A vivid 
desired future, for example, may establish a tenacious reference point against which any 
changes will be experienced as losses. For projects where nimble strategies are desired, 
practitioners may consider lessoning the vividness of the future scenario to mitigate this 
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effect, and to support pivoting as new information or options emerge.  
 
9.3 Repeated Cycles  
One finding that emerged from the research is the probability that, instead of liberating 
thinking, a foresight process introduces different but equally tenacious anchors that may 
constrain subsequent expansive thinking. Using multiple or repeated cycles in a foresight 
project may allow for repeatedly establishing anchors, shifting or adjusting as far as possible 
from them, setting new anchors, and repeating the process to ultimately achieve expansive 
thought or a similar effect. Building on this insight, there may be value in testing the 
hypotheses that 1) repeated cycles in a foresight project can shift anchors to simulate 
expansive thinking, and 2) this may be a best-available alternative given that anchoring is 
tenacious and otherwise limits expansive thinking.   
 
9.4 Under- and Over-representation 
Judgments of the anticipated impact and likelihood of events, including risks, probabilities, 
and uncertainties, are affected by cognitive biases. This occurs even when we are aware of 
the impact of heuristics on our decision-making. For foresight practitioners, then, it may be 
important to scan specifically for various types of events to counteract the impact of these 
cognitive biases. For example, knowing that events or elements that do not evoke a strong 
affective response (especially a dread reaction) tend be ignored or under-represented in 




Similarly, steps should be taken to ensure that elements with high-probability but low-dread 
affect are factored into strategy considerations, since these will otherwise be under-
represented. By contrast, risk(s) of events that are statistically rare but that have occurred 
recently in the domain of inquiry will tend to be exaggerated. It may be worth calculating 
and applying statistical probabilities to uncertain risks to support and complement the 
assessments of project participants. 
 
9.5 New Scanning Frameworks 
To further strategic foresight practices by applying behavioural insights, a suggested next 
step is the development and testing of new or modified tools and strategies to identify, 
assess and account for heuristic biases in a project domain. Such tools would be designed 
to highlight elements that can cause friction in the project domain through their 
availability, affect and dread associations that contribute to strong, unstated biases. Friction 
in this sense is associated with:  
1) Elements that distract individuals from noticing higher impact/probability events 
2) Elements that act as a reference point for loss aversion 
3) Elements that define a sense of status quo, and 
4) Those that are highly/commonly available in the domain and among experts, key 
stakeholders, and informants. These may be hegemonic (a paradigm, formula, set 





This investigation was designed as a transdisciplinary exploration of human decision-
making in risk and uncertainty with the aim of applying these behavioural insights to 
improving strategic foresight and scenario planning frameworks.  To fulfill this objective, 
the research responded to three questions: 
1) What informs and influences individual human decision-making in situations 
of uncertainty and risk? 
2) How do these decision-making frameworks interact with strategic foresight 
approaches to problem solving? 
3) How might foresight approaches be improved by incorporating these insights 
into individual human decision-making?  
 
An extensive literature review began to address the first research question. This secondary 
research component incorporated literature from standard economics, behavioural 
economics, cognitive psychology and other psychology disciplines, negotiations theory, and 
decision-making theory. Drawing on the literature from these diverse fields of study on 
human perceptions of risk and decision-making under uncertainty, this investigation 
highlighted heuristics and related cognitive biases that influence individual human 
behaviours.  From this review and synthesis of the literature, themes in mental shortcuts, 
heuristics and biases that influence decision-making and perceptions of probabilities were 




Since strategic foresight project design varies by practitioner and project in level of 
engagement, stakeholder-centredness, methods for processing information, vividness of 
communication tools, and other factors, a highly recognizable and time-tested six-step 
strategic foresight method was outlined as a framework for this inquiry.  Behavioural 
insights surfaced throughout this research were then applied to this strategic foresight 
framework, and implications were explored and discussed. Recommended improvements 
to existing models were presented and discussed as a starting point for further dialogue in 
the field. 
 
The research material was further investigated by applying narrative as a thinking tool to 
explore and surface additional implications. The narrative component complements the 
traditional version of the paper, and provides for a dual reading. One is analytical and 
reflective – the academic reading of the research, which is consistent with the ways 
standard economics and decision-making theory suggest make good decisions should be 
made. The other – the narrative – provides an experiential application of the material using 
a contemporary complex problem where foresight might be of benefit. Using narrative, 
findings were applied to and illuminated through a contemporary case study of proposed 
nuclear waste storage in an Ontario community.  
 
Part of the promise of a strategic foresight approach is its capacity to overcome individual 
biases and limits to expansive thinking, with the aim of facilitating strategic discussions 
about possible futures to improve decision-making in the present.  This paper concluded 
that, to fully manifest this promise, practitioners must be aware of the impacts 
! 
79 
biases at all stages of a strategic foresight process, and apply such behavioural insights to 
improve foresight tools and frameworks. 
 
10.1 Further Research !
This paper argues that strategic foresight frameworks can be further aligned with their 
implicit and explicit promise through a concerted application of behavioural insights into 
human decision-making in risk and uncertainty. Further research and new or modified 
tools may clarify and support such improvements. 
 
10.1.1 New Scanning Frameworks and Tools 
To further strategic foresight practices by applying behavioural insights, one 
recommendation proposed earlier is the development and testing of new or modified tools 
and strategies for identifying, assessing and accounting for heuristic biases in a project 
domain. Effective tools would be designed to highlight elements that can cause friction in 
the project domain through their availability, affect and dread associations that contribute 
to strong, unstated biases. Such a friction scan would identify:  
1) Elements that distract individuals from noticing higher impact/probability events 
2) Elements that act as a reference point for loss aversion 
3) Elements that define a sense of status quo, and 
4) Those that are highly/commonly available in the domain and among experts, key 
stakeholders, and informants.  
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One possibility is to add Friction or some similar concept to the current STEEPV 
framework. Testing and iterating on a STEEPV+F tool, and sharing results across the field 
could speed and improve this process through further application, iteration and dialogue. !
Comparative analysis of how having such information on heuristic friction could impact 
and/or improve outcomes of a foresight project is an area for further research.  !!
10.1.2 Repeated Cycles !
One finding that emerged from the research is the possibility that a foresight process, in 
contrast with its promise of liberating thinking, introduces its own anchors that constrain 
subsequent expansive thought. As previously noted, using multiple or repeated cycles in a 
foresight project may counter this effect by allowing for repeatedly establishing anchors, 
shifting or adjusting as far as possible from them, setting new anchors, and repeating the 
process to ultimately achieve expansive thought or a similar effect.  
 
Building on this insight, there may be value in testing the hypotheses that 1) multiple or 
repeated cycles in a foresight project can shift anchors to simulate expansive thinking, and 
2) this may be a best-available alternative given that anchoring is tenacious and otherwise 
limits expansive thinking.  Additionally, if it seems viable that repeated cycles of anchoring 
and adjusting can achieve or at least approximate improved expansive thinking, the field 
might benefit from further exploration of how to move through such cycles at a faster 
cadence without losing quality.  !!
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10.1.3 Public Policy 
In public domains, vivid emotional responses to some risks may lead to calls for regulation 
or policy to mitigate perceived (usually dread-associated) risk. Additionally, situations may 
arise where there may be public resistance to regulation when a risk triggers little or no 
emotional response. There is an opportunity to explore ways a heuristic-informed foresight 
framework could complement current technical risk assessments and policy decision-
making frameworks (including cost-benefit analyses) to ensure evaluations includes both 
analytic and experiential frameworks. Any robust process would account for and embrace 
the different ways technical experts and non-experts in a domain perceive risks, including 
probabilities of individual factors, uncertainty over long time horizons, and the concepts of 
burden of risk and irreversibility.  
 
10.1.4 Diversity Considerations 
One question that remains is: does any of this matter?  Does diversity across and among 
individuals in a strategic foresight project counteract any or all of the effects outlined 
above? This paper argues that a concerted application of the outlined behavioural insights 
to strategic foresight practice can produce results that more consistently align with the 
stated aims and promise of the foresight field than current frameworks allow. It is possible, 
however, that foresight as it is commonly practiced may produce similar ends accidentally. 
This possibility is raised by the example of multiple of repeated cycles producing a 
simulation of expansive thinking by shifting anchors through time or across project 




In projects where the aim and focus question concentrate on stimulating liberated thinking 
and facilitating strategic discussions about possible futures, the diversity issue may be 
accounted for within current frameworks. In other projects, however, the stated aim is to 
produce good decisions, and avoid bad ones. This is evident in the nuclear domain case 
example outlined in the narrative of this paper. In such a problem domain, rich and 
expansive exploration is not sufficient. There is pressure to get things right – or at least to 
not get them wrong – since some choices could have catastrophic and irreversible impacts. 
These need to be identified and avoided, at least in terms of keeping options open until 
more information or better alternatives emerge. In such a case, being aware of and 
controlling for the impact of information framing on subsequent risk-seeking and avoiding 
behaviours, for example, could be critical to producing good strategy decisions. Simply 
having diversity in input may not suffice if the systemic and unintended impacts of 
heuristics are not controlled for where plausible in the process. 
 
By contrast, in an exploratory project where unfettered thinking about a domain is a key 
project objective, this research raises the possibility that the greatest diversity can be 
achieved not through methods that recruit for the broadest significant representation from 
across a domain, but from among those with no previous contact with the stated problem or 
focus question. Based on this research, it is possible to speculate that recruiting team 
members, informants and participants naïve to the domain in question may diversify the 
reference points of various heuristics (affect, anchoring, and availability heuristics, in 
particular) and produce the most expansive, and un- or diversely-fettered exploration. This 
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may be one of the mechanisms underpinning innovation and radical breakthroughs in a 
field frequently generated by those who are new to it, or who come from an outside 
discipline. 
 
We were new to the field. We didn’t know it was impossible. 
- Amir Safari-Naeini and Oskar Painter on measuring quantum motions 100,000th 
 the radius of an atom in microscale objects using light 
 
In this research, the predictability of shifts and references points related to heuristics and 
related biases were coded subjectively and explored briefly. This may provide a starting 
point for more robust investigation of these effects and their relationship with diversity 
considerations. Further research into the interactions and implications of diversity and 
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Appendix A:  Cascade Diagram of Heuristics, Biases 
and Effects  
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B: Additional Heuristics, Biases and Effects 
Asymmetry principle  
It is easier to lose or destroy trust than to build it. Slovic (1997) outlines that incidents that 
damage trust are usually clearly defined. They are events or moments that are noticeable 
and noted, while the types of things that build trust are not. Slovic gives this example: 
“How many positive events are represented by the safe operation of a nuclear power plant 
for one day? Dozens of events? Hundreds? When events are invisible or poorly defined, 
they carry little or no weight in shaping our attitudes and opinions” (1997, p. 302). 
Additionally, when either type of incident is visible, Slovic’s research suggests trust-
destroying events have a disproportionate impact. 
 
Burden of Risk   
While cost-benefit analysis and other assessment methods tend to examine hazards or 
interventions individually (Fischhoff et al., 1979), people include in their perceptions of 
risk a sense of equity – the concept of burden of risk. Is there a disproportionate cumulative 
risk? Is it unfair? Individuals tend to weigh risks, threats, interventions in combination.  
 
Finite Pool of Worry 
It has been suggested (Linville & Fischer, 1991; Marx & Weber, 2012) that people have a 
limited capacity to worry, what Linville and Fischer refer to as the Finite Pool of Worry, so 
that as worry about one hazard increases, worry about other hazards decreases.  
 
Introspection / Justification  
Thinking about the reasons for a decision in advance of making a choice can interfere with 
decision making and lead to poor choices or undesired outcomes. Multiple studies have 
found that research subjects asked to think about the reasons for their decisions before 
deciding made poorer quality decisions measured against expert insights than those who 
did not think about or justify their choices (McMackin & Slovic, 2000; Wilson & Schooler, 
1991). The researchers concluded that thinking about pros and cons of decisions created 
distractions in the choice process by focusing attention on “non-optimal criteria” to the 






Overconfidence   
Most people are overconfident in the accuracy of their judgments almost all the time – 
especially when the accuracy is near the same level as pure chance. Not correlated to 
intelligence, and occurs among both laypeople and experts in a domain. Interestingly, Marx 
and Weber (2012, p. 107) highlight the broad literature that suggests some people are likely 
to exhibit little overconfidence – these include professions that receive immediate and 
constant feedback, including bookies and weather forecasters. Overconfidence may be 
partially an outcome of Confirmation Bias in which we are prone to seeking and 
synthesizing information – including from our own experienced memory searches – that 
reinforces our existing beliefs while avoiding challenges to such beliefs. Marx and Weber 
(2012) point out the downside to overconfidence is it reduces the inclination to seek 
additional information that might support consideration of alternatives.  
 
Principle of Insufficient Reason 
Sunstein (2007) refers to the Principle of Insufficient Reason, that states when people lack 
info about probabilities they act as if all probabilities are equally likely. 
 
Single Action Bias  
 
This is the tendency to take a single action to mitigate threats. Even when a multi-pronged 
response would have clear advantages, people are inclined to engage in only a single action 
because that one step removes the “hazard flag” (Marx & Weber, 2012) that provokes a 
response. 
 
Trades-Offs   
 
Schwartz’s (B. Schwartz, 2004) research into trade offs between or among options suggests 
that when faced with a single compelling option, we freely grasp it; however, when a second 
attractive option is introduced, it introduces trade offs that paralyze many decision makers. 
Trade offs introduce conflict, and Schwartz’s research suggests such a conflict induces 
people to avoid choosing, altogether, even when the stakes are trivial (B. Schwartz, 2004, 
pp. 126–7).  The phenomenon lies partly in the inclination to justify our decisions – to 
seek grounds for rejecting or selecting an option. This is more challenging when we 
consider multiple options, each of which might have features that are desirable.  
 
Worst-Case Scenarios   
 
People perceive and treat situations as safe or unsafe based on emotional reactions (affect) 
to them and without looking at the likelihood of harm (Sunstein, 2007). Frequently ignore 
low-probability, high-impact events and round the perceived risk down to zero. Unless they 
have access (availability) to a negative outcome, in which case they exaggerate the risk. We 
react to worst-case scenarios with either / both indifference and overreaction.  
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Zero-risk bias  
 
The tendency to prefer the complete elimination of a risk even when alternative options 
produce a greater reduction in risk overall. Research has demonstrated that people were 
willing to pay a disproportionately high price to completely eliminate a small risk (Baron, 
Gowda, & Kunreuther, 1993). 
